“Social Decision Making. Social Dilemmas, Social Values, and Ethical Judgments” von Max H. Bazerman u.a.

Part of what makes the appropriateness framework more “social” than rational choice models is the assumption that the rules applied to choices will often be a consequence of perceived social norms. In a recent re- view of the norms literature, Cialdini and his colleagues defined social norms as “understood rules for accepted and expected behavior” (Cialdini, Bator, & Guadagno, 1999, p. 196). They further characterized norms as “rules for behavior” and “guidelines for socially appro- priate behavior” (p. 195). When people focus their atten- tion on social norms, such norms have been found to be highly predictive of behavioral choice (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). Furthermore, long-standing psychological theo- ries assume that, when people are uncertain about ap- propriate behavior in a social context, they will look to others for clues (e.g., Festinger, 1954). …

The greatest single shortcoming of EU models when applied to social dilemmas is that they are insufficiently social to account for the heterodox factors and interactions that drive real, observed behavior. To accommodate the stylized facts of real behavior, rational choice theorists are forced to create new “utility functions” for each deviation from rationality. …

The phenomena that we described in this section are perhaps the most important in highlighting the differences between traditional rational choice models and the appropriateness framework. The former focuses attention on the underlying economic structure of deci- sion situations; the latter acknowledges that this structure is important but also accepts the importance of surface features that deal with interpretations, connotations, assumed causal processes, and linguistic variations—variables that create an interpretational stretch for rational choice theories. A psychology of decision making that rests on the appropriateness framework can handle these phenomena in stride whereas an economics of decision making that privileges risks and consequences does so less gracefully. …

It is not our purpose in this article to attack rational choice or expected utility models per se. The point that we want to make about these approaches to the explanation of social behavior is that they do a good job in some contexts and a less good job in others. Our approach parallels that of Fiske (1992) who argued that there are four elemental forms of social life and that these four forms characterize different domains of our social worlds. One of these forms, which Fiske refers to as “market pricing,” is similar to the consequentialist focus of rational choice theories. Our claim, similar to that of Fiske, is not that market pricing such as rational choice models of social behavior are wrong, just that they have been, in the case of social dilemmas, overgeneralized. The logic of appropriateness that we are advocating is a conceptual perspective that allows us to ask how else social dilemmas are perceived and how these perceptions influence decision behavior.

Weitere Informationen:

Ethical Decision Making: The Person in the Process

A Conceptual Review of Decision Making in Social Dilemmas: Applying a Logic of Appropriateness”

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